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As a country we face a great challenge; the challenge to do everything 
possible to make Americans safe at their workplaces. But, what is the measure 
of that challenge? How can we know when we have done everything possible? 
While there is no doubt that reported deaths and injuries have declined over the 
years, is there a number that is acceptable as the cost of doing business? At 
what point can we say that we have done enough? Is one preventable death 
acceptable? Are more rules and regulations going to move the statistical 
needle? Or, without meaningful deterrence and enforcement, are more rules 
and regulations just thousands of words on the pages of the Federal Register? 
Does protecting American workers extend beyond their physical safety at a 
work site, to caring for the workers, and their families, when they become 
injured, disabled, or die? 
Before addressing these questions, it is important to consider the arguments 
of those who oppose robust and effective health and safety laws, and a larger 
role for government oversight and leadership. To begin with, there is a popular, 
if not prevailing, view in America that throws up its hands and reduces the 
complexity of worker safety to the simple notion that life is inherently and 
randomly dangerous, and we cannot be expected to protect every worker, nor 
should we. Accidents happen. Trains derail. Cars crash. Workers get injured, 
and die at their jobs.  
 
 † “What Can We Do?” is excerpted from the author’s recently finished book, Dying to Work, a 
collection of short stories from and about workers who were injured or killed on the job. The stories are 
portraits of the worker, their life, dreams, and, of course, about their accident that tragically changed their life 
and the lives of everyone around them. The stories are bookended first by a brief history of safety laws that 
still today leave millions of workers without effective compensation and employers without any meaningful 
incentive to keep their workers safe. In the last part of the book, and from interviews with leaders in politics, 
government, business and labor, Dying to Work attempts to provide some answers to questions about worker 
safety, and to offer policy suggestions that may make American workers safer and employers more 
accountable. 
  Jonathan D. Karmel has practiced labor and employment law for more than 30 years representing 
unions and their employee benefit funds. Jon is a Fellow with The College of Labor and Employment 
Lawyers, and has been recognized as an Illinois Super Lawyer. Jon is a frequent panelist on labor topics, and 
has lectured internationally, including to members of the legal profession in Shanghai, China on cross-border 
employment issues and the role of arbitration in resolving disputes, and at the University of Costa Rica Law 
School on the relationship between union density and income inequality. Most springs Jon travels to the 
Emory University School of Law to be a faculty member in the Kessler-Eidson Program for Trial Techniques. 
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This fatalism has been widely appropriated by politicians and policy 
makers as the go-to rebuttal to practically any social problem that could be 
fixed or ameliorated by the hand of government. This do-nothing attitude is 
most often expressed in the gun debate; any type of gun control regulation will 
not stop all killings, so why increase regulation at all? It is the marching beat 
of the big government that destroys our freedoms. Workers, and worker safety, 
have not escaped the broad brush of this public policy nihilism. But it is an 
inherently unsound and immoral argument, especially when it comes to worker 
health and safety. 
Two prominent conservative think tanks, the Cato Institute (“Cato”) and 
the Mercatus Center at George Mason University (“Mercatus”), are 
archetypical of those who espouse and promote this “anti-government 
organizing” philosophy and, in turn lobby politicians to codify its principles.
1
 
Cato was founded by the Charles Koch Foundation.
2
 David Koch is a member 
of Cato’s Board of Directors.
3
  When it comes to worker safety, Cato has 
argued that free markets “have done much better than governments at 
providing safety” for workers.
4
 Founded in 1980, Mercatus labels itself as a 
university-based research center for “market-oriented ideas.”
5
 Mercatus’ Board 
of Director, Richard Fink, is also an Executive Vice President of Koch 
Industries, Inc., and a member of its Board of Directors.
6
 He founded Mercatus 
in 1978, which was briefly housed at Rutgers University before relocating to 
George Mason in 1980.
7
 Charles Koch sits on Mercatus’ Board of Directors.
8
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Cato publishes a quarterly journal, Regulation, which boasts that it 
examines nearly every market, “and nearly every government regulation.”
10
 Its 
contributors and editorial board include the most prominent conservative 
thinkers and academicians in America, including the late Supreme Court 
Justice Antonin Scalia.
11
 In 1995, Regulation published an article with the 
make-no-mistake-about- it title “Abolishing OSHA”.
12
 The authors, Thomas J. 
Kniesner and John D. Leeth, argue that “OSHA can never be expected to be 
effective in promoting worker safety; that an expanded OSHA will cost jobs as 
well as taxpayer dollars; and that other means currently keep workplace deaths 
and injuries low and can reduce them even more.”
13
 This conclusion neatly fits 
into Cato’s anti-government and anti-regulatory construct, but it is a badly 
flawed. 
One of the most inconvenient truths standing in the way of this argument is 
the indisputable fact that since OSHA’s inception in 1970, workplace deaths 
have decreased more than 66% as of 2013.
14
 During this same period, 
occupational injuries and illnesses declined by 67%.
15
 All of this occurred at a 
time when the United States workforce nearly doubled in size.
16
 Fatalities went 
from 38 workers per day in 1970 to 12 per day in 2013.
17
 As of 2014, injuries 
and illness are down to 3.3 per 100 workers from 11 per 100 in 1970.
18
 How 
does Leeth address these facts? He argues that the decline in workplace 
injuries has more to do with temporal coincidence than anything attributable to 
OSHA.
19
  Faced with more than 40 years of data, Leeth asserts in a 2013 
Mercatus article that OSHA is “not the major cause” of the decline. However, 





 10 About Regulation Magazine, CATO INST., http://www.cato.org/regulation/about (last visited Feb. 
2016).  
 11 Id. 
 12 Thomas J. Kniesner & John D. Leeth, Abolishing OSHA, 4 REGULATION. 46 (1995).  
 13 Id. 
 14 Occupational Safety & Health Admin., Commonly Used Statistics, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (2016), 
https://www.osha.gov/oshstats/commonstats.html.  
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Occupational Safety & Health Admin., supra note 14. 
 18 Id. 
 19 John Leeth & Nathan Hale, Evaluating OSHA’s Effectiveness and Suggestions for Reform, MERCATUS 
CTR. (Apr. 23, 2013), http://mercatus.org/publication/evaluating-oshas-effectiveness-and-suggestions-reform. 
 20 Id. 
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This would be a major concession, albeit belated, from the author of 
Abolishing OSHA, except that the “modest” role might have been even greater 
if OSHA had been given more resources to protect workers, and not less. In a 
revealing moment of tone deafness, typical of those that spin facts to fit their 
belief systems without considering an alternative reality, Leeth writes that 
OSHA’s inspection efforts have only reduced injuries by 4%.
21
 Stop and take a 
moment to think about that statement made in support of the ineffectiveness of 
OSHA. Then, consider the fact that OSHA is armed with very few inspectors; 
there are only about “2,200 inspectors responsible for the health and safety of 
130 million workers, employed at more than 8 million worksites around the 
nation—which translates to around one compliance officer for every 59,000 
workers.”
22
 Given this miniscule enforcement resource, it is a wonder that 
inspections have reduced injuries by even as little as 4%.
23
 Rather than argue 
for more inspections, the do-nothing “anti-governmenters” want fewer 
inspections, even as the data indisputably shows that employers who have been 
inspected have fewer safety problems later on. A study of more than 500,000 
OSHA inspections found that total violations decreased by 28-48% from the 
initial OSHA inspection to the second.
24
 
Even for Cato and Mercatus acolytes, it is tough to continue to insist that 
OSHA “can never be expected to be effective in promoting worker safety” 
when faced with hard facts that assert otherwise.
25
 Thus, the updated view 
offered by Cato, Mercatus and others, is that “OSHA can best complement the 
other pillars of the U.S. policy system by providing information to workers 
about possible hazards, particularly health-related hazards, and by gearing 
inspections toward worksites where dangers are hard to monitor and firms 
employing less mobile and less knowledgeable workers.”
26
 This hard won 
acknowledgement is long overdue, but is tempered by the persistent 
denigration of OSHA’s funding and rule making authority. Instead, it is argued 
that OSHA is merely a complement to the other pillars of worker safety 
policy.
27
 It is important to note, at this point no worker safety advocates have 
 
 21 Id. 
 22 Occupational Safety & Health Admin., supra note 14. 
 23 Leeth & Hale, supra note 19. 
 24 David Michaels, OSHA Does Not Kill Jobs; It Helps Prevent Jobs From Killing Workers, 55 AM. J.  
INDUS. MED. 961 (2012). 
 25 Kniesner & Leeth, supra note 12. 
 26 John Leeth, OSHA’s Role in Promoting Occupational Safety and Health, MERCATUS CTR. (Nov. 13, 
2012), http://mercatus.org/publication/oshas-role-promoting-occupational-safety-and-health. 
 27 Id. 
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ever argued that OSHA is the only pillar in worker safety policy. Rather, they 
assert that OSHA is part of a comprehensive occupational health and safety 
regime.
28
 Nonetheless, let us examine a policy system that the other pillars of 
the market-oriented proponents claim will protect American workers. 
A 2008 Cato policy report argues that “[f]ree markets have done much 
better than government at providing [worker] safety, fairness, economic 
security, and environmental sustainability.”
29
 Simply stated, there is nothing 
that this single source solution could not fix if the government would just get 
out of its way. But in regard to workplace safety, Henderson writes, “[i]n short, 
there is and has been a ‘market for safety.’”
30
 Leeth similarly argues that the 
labor market is one of the four pillars in the U.S. worker safety policy 
system.
31
 “The positive relationship between wages and risk means firms with 
better safety records are rewarded in the market by being able to pay less to 
attract equally qualified workers than firms with worse safety records.”
32
 Let 
us see if this statement holds true. 
The argument is that workers demand job safety “by the wage premium we 
insist on to take a given risk.” As this so-called risk-wage premium rose, 
employers found it cheaper to avoid the risk premium by increasing safety in 
the workplace.
33
 One of the many fallacies of this argument is the assumption 
that workers are aware of the risks in their workplace, and armed with this 
information, can make an informed, rational decision about whether to work 
there and at what price. This is an enormous assumption that, in the real world, 
simply does not exist. We know that employers and employees underreport in 
substantial numbers.
34
 Accordingly, true and accurate information is simply 
unavailable.
35
 Moreover, in almost all instances, workers simply do not possess 
the information to demand a wage premium based on an assessed risk, accurate 
 
 28 Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (2016). 
 29 David R. Henderson, Are We Ailing from Too Much Deregulation, CATO INST. (Dec. 2008), 
http://www.cato.org/policy-report/novemberdecember-2008/are-we-ailing-too-much-deregulation. 
 30 Id. 
 31 John Leeth, OSHA’s Role In Promoting Occupational Safety and Health, MERCATUS CTR. (Nov. 13, 
2012), http://mercatus.org/publication/oshas-role-promoting-occupational-safety-and-health. 
 32 Id. 
 33 David R. Henderson, Are We Ailing from Too Much Deregulation, CATO INST. (Dec. 2008), 
http://www.cato.org/policy-report/novemberdecember-2008/are-we-ailing-too-much-deregulation. 
 34 Thomas A. Robinson, New Study Points to Significant Underreporting of Injuries to Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, LEXISNEXIS (Aug. 29, 2014, 7:27 PM), http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/workers-
compensation/b/recent-cases-news-trends-developments/archive/2014/08/29/new-study-points-to-significant-
underreporting-of-injuries-to-bureau-of-labor-statistics.aspx. 
 35 Id. 
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or otherwise.
36
 Even if an employer’s real safety record is known to a worker 
when completing a job application while sitting in the human resource office, 
workers are not insurance companies—they are unable to underwrite their 
expected wage rate based on the safety risk of their prospective employer. 
They simply are not armed with the ability to handicap their job risk, nor do 
they possess the bargaining power to use the information as leverage against a 
prospective employer.
37
 As will be discussed, this inequality of bargaining 
power is even greater in the context of non-union workers. 
Regardless, by the very nature of a particular job or industry some risks are 
patently obvious. Working in an underground coal mine, one thousand feet 
inside a mountain, poses an obvious risk for which a worker could demand a 
higher wage. But even then, the most important information is often unknown. 
For example, miners working at the Upper Big Branch mine were unaware that 
their employer was violating mine safety laws, including those designed to 
prevent mine explosions, when the mine exploded from coal dust 
combustion.
38
 Had they known the real risks involved with their jobs, there is 
certainly no wage premium large enough that a reasonable worker would have 
accepted. 
That is, of course, unless there are no other jobs tucked into the hollers of 
West Virginia or eastern Kentucky, which raises yet another fallacy in the 
market-oriented argument. In a scenario where supply outstrips demand, 
particularly in time periods or industry sectors with high unemployment, basic 
economics dictate that workers can demand nothing in the way of a wage-risk 
premium.
39
 They take the jobs that are there offered at the wage offered. Thus, 
notwithstanding the inherent dangers in the dangerous underground mining, for 
these workers there is mining or the military. 
Moreover, the ability of workers to demand higher wages has historically 
depended in large part on their power to bargain. In 2012, the Wall Street 
Journal acknowledged the existence of a union-wage premium of around 23% 
 
 36 Gabriel Brunswick et al., Comments on the Forthcoming Injury and Illness Prevention Program Rule 
(RIN 1218—AC48), N.Y.U. (Aug. 7, 2013), http://policyintegrity.org/documents/Policy_Integrity_Letter_on_ 
I2P2.pdf. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Samira J. Simone, Mining Disaster Raises Questions About Effectiveness of Safety Laws, CNN (Aug. 
9, 2010, 6:19 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/04/09/west.virginia.mine.safety/. 
 39 Supply, Demand, and the Invisible Hand, INFOPLEASE (2003), http://www.infoplease.com/cig/ 
economics/change-supply.html. 
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between workers in right-to-work states versus non-right-to-work states.
40
  In 
union settings, workers can demand a higher wage through their ability to 
bargain collectively.
41
 Not so much for non-union workers, including those 
working in the largely union-free underground coal mining industry.
42
 
Furthermore, the benefits of unionization and collective bargaining also 
extend to safety. Union work sites are safer than non-union work sites.
43
 
However, this is not attributable to the union-wage premium, but rather to the 
negotiated mechanisms and legal protections in place at a union work site. For 
example, unions often negotiate safety rules and have robust safety 
committees.
44
 Moreover, workers at a union plant are less fearful to complain 
about unsafe working conditions than at a non-union plant.
45
 Nowhere is this 
more evident than in the coal industry where miners fear for their jobs if they 
raise health or safety concerns. The Upper Big Branch was a non-union mine.
46
 
According to the United Mine Workers of America, between 2002 and 2010 
“[only around] 11 percent of U.S. coal mining fatalities—or 30 fatalities—
have occurred at unionized mines.”
47
 
Finally, the laissez faire risk-wage premium that is supposed to invisibly 
protect workers is of little protection to the millions of low wage workers, 
many of whom are women of color and undocumented.
48
 The risk-wage 
premium for these workers is virtually non-existent, particularly for 
undocumented workers in dangerous industries like construction and 
landscaping.
49
 The threat of deportation and other penalties for immigration 
 
 40 Ben Casselman, Closer Look at Union vs. Nonunion Workers’ Wages, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 17, 2012, 
3:40 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2012/12/17/closer-look-at-union-vs-nonunion-workers-wages/. 
 41 Daniel Disalvo, The Trouble with Public Sector Unions, NAT’L AFFAIRS (2010), 
http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-trouble-with-public-sector-unions. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Scott Schneider, Yes, Union Construction Really is Safer, LABORERS’ HEALTH & SAFETY FUND N AM. 
(Oct. 2015), http://www.lhsfna.org/index.cfm/lifelines/october-2015/yes-union-construction-really-is-safer/. 
 44 Id. 
 45 James Sherk, What Unions Do: How Labor Unions Affect Jobs and the Economy, THE HERITAGE 
FOUND. (May 21, 2009), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/05/what-unions-do-how-labor-unions-
affect-jobs-and-the-economy. 
 46 David Moberg, Fatalities Higher at Non-Union Mines—Like Massey’s Upper Big Branch, IN THESE 
TIMES (Apr. 9, 2010, 12:51 PM), http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/5813/fatalities_higher_at_non-
union_mineslike_masseys_upper_big_branch. 
 47 Daniel Malloy, Are Union Mines Safer?, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (Apr. 18, 2010, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.post-gazette.com/local/region/2010/04/18/Are-union-mines-safer/stories/201004180265. 
 48 Injustice On Our Plates, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Nov. 7, 2010), https://www.splcenter.org/20101108/ 
injustice-our-plates. 
 49 Id. 
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violations naturally reins in a worker’s demand for a higher wage in exchange 
for a safety risk. Additionally, the risk-wage premium offers no protection for 
the millions of temporary workers who have many “new” jobs each year in 
different industries and are given little or no safety training at their temporary 
job.
50
 These workers, typically without a union, can be “returned” to the 
employment agency for a less difficult worker. 
In the end, today there is no risk that wage premium can adequately protect, 
if at all, American workers. Instead, in the United States, the workforce is more 
part-time than ever before;
51
 and the new temporary worker is waiting to take 
their place. Unionization is at 11% of the workforce, a historical low water 
mark.
52
 Against this backdrop of a fractured and vulnerable workforce, the 
politics and philosophy of lassiez faire fatalism promoted by the ascended 
plutocracy, championed and funded by the Koch brothers,
53
 has continued to 
put American workers at great risk, but with no risk-wage premium. 
The other two pillars protecting workers, according to Leeth, are the legal 
and workers compensation systems.
54
 But, for the free marketers, these 
systems work as intended, a true statement, but not necessarily for the good of 
worker safety. 
The legal system, which the free marketers argue incentivizes employers to 
provide safe working conditions for fear of financial liability, actually does 
nothing of the sort. The workers’ compensation system was precisely designed 
to insulate employers from liability imposed in a court by a jury for the death 
and injuries to its workers.
55
 Injured workers, and surviving family members, 
have no legal recourse against their employers outside of workers’ 
compensation benefits.
56
 As such, legal claims can only be brought against 
 
 50 Id. 
 51 Jill Mislinski, Ratio of Part-Time Employed Remains Higher Than the Pre-Recession Levels, ADVISOR 
PERSPECTIVES (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www.advisorperspectives.com/dshort/updates/Full-Time-vs-Part-Time-
Employment. 
 52 Union Members Summary, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Jan. 28, 2016, 10:00am), 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm. 
 53 Dave Levinthal, How the Koch Brothers Are Influencing U.S. Colleges, TIME (Dec. 15, 2015), 
http://time.com/4148838/koch-brothers-colleges-universities/. 
 54 John D. Leeth, OSHA’s Role in Promoting Occupational Safety and Health, MERCATUS CTR, Nov. 
2012, at 4. 
 55 What Employer’s Need to Know About Workers’ Compensation Insurance, 360 DEGREES OF 
FINANCIAL LITERACY, http://www.360financialliteracy.org/Topics/Insurance/General-Insurance-Topics/What-
Employers-Need-to-Know-about-Workers-Compensation-Insurance. 
 56 Id. 
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third-parties, for example the manufacture of a machine that injured an 
employee.
57
 But, these claims are exceedingly difficult and expensive to prove, 
and are often subject to liability caps that were enacted by politicians hostile to 
worker safety, and beholden to the likes of the Kochs and their allies.
58
 
The final pillar, workers’ compensation, is a varied system of state laws 
that depends on the same hostile politicians for their continued existence and 
benefit levels. Too many workers live and work in states with workers’ 
compensation systems that make it difficult for them to obtain adequate 
benefits. In a bit of a spoiler alert, the dominance of corporate money in 
politics has resulted in the significant reduction of workers’ compensation 
benefits and the creation of more legal hurdles for workers to clear before they 
receive these parsimonious benefits.
59
 These same politicians tout their failed - 
for workers—workers’ compensation systems as a reason for businesses to 
relocate to their employer friendly states.
60
 For example, the Indiana Economic 
Development Corporation, the State’s economic development agency, proudly 
brags on its website the usual list of pro-business incentives for businesses 
considering whether to move to Indiana.
61
 These include its low corporate tax 
rate, right-to-work law, and that Indiana has the nation’s second lowest 
workers’ compensation rates.
62
 These rates, and lower workers’ compensation 
costs, are attributable in large part to Indiana’s low average weekly wages, 
35th in the Nation.
63
 Yet, despite the low wages, and low workers’ 
compensation rates, Indiana had the tenth highest worker fatality rate in 2013, 
only surpassed by states with much larger workforces.
64
  In the end, this race to 
the bottom exposes more and more workers to the vagaries of a deeply flawed 
 
 57 Third-Party Liability, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/injury/negligence-theory/third-party-liability/. 
 58 Environmental Working Group, Koch Brothers Exposed for Campaign Contributions to 19 Members 
of Congress Who Voted to Deny Fair Compensation to Asbestos Victims, ECO WATCH (July 16, 2015, 10:42 
AM), http://ecowatch.com/2015/07/16/koch-brothers-exposed-asbestos/. 
 59 Howard Berkes, Injured Workers Suffer As ‘Reforms’ Limit Workers’ Compensation Benefits, NPR 
(Mar. 23, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/03/04/390441655/injured-workers-suffer-as-reforms-limit-workers-
compensation-benefits. 
 60 Matthew DeFour, Republicans Pushing Possible Changes to Workers’ Comp System, WISC. STATE 
JOURNAL (Sep. 15, 2013), http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/republicans-pushing-
possible-changes-to-workers-comp-system/article_1d1d6f1f-d210-5282-ba90-fc7c461d0143.html. 
 61 Incentives, INDIANA.GOV, http://iedc.in.gov/incentives (last visited Feb. 2016). 
 62 Id. 
 63 Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (2015), 
http://www.bls.gov/cew/apps/table_maker/v4/table_maker.htm#type=0&year=2015&qtr=2&own=5&ind=10&
supp=0. 
 64 2013 Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (2013), 
http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/rate2013in.pdf. 
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workers’ compensation system in need of a national overhaul, an unlikely 
outcome in this era of corporate money poisoning our political processes. As 
such, rather than creating an economic incentive for employers to provide a 
safe workplace, the workers’ compensation system, with its legions of 
insurance adjusters and their chosen doctors, serve instead to protect and 
insulate employers from any legal liability and meaningful financial exposure. 
Grim as this all sounds, are there any solutions? Can we do better? Yes, 
and yes. And, it is important to keep in mind that there are no bad ideas to any 
of the health and safety problems facing workers in America. If we stop 
putting forth ideas, no matter how dispiriting it is to be constantly pushing the 
boulder up the hill, especially against such a well-funded and resourced 
opposition, then the workers will have lost. That means us, our families and 
our friends will suffer. This excerpt will analyze the need for enhanced civil 
penalties and criminal prosecutions as a means to keep American workers 
safer. 
Enhanced Civil Penalties and Criminal Prosecutions: 
There is no single silver bullet for making workers safer. But, criminal 
prosecutions and enhanced penalties may be the closest thing to one. At a 
Health, Education, Labor & Pensions (“HELP”) Senate hearing on April 29, 
2008, then Chairman Kennedy began by noting that the median civil penalty 
for a workplace fatality in 2007 was $3,675, a number which had largely 
remained unchanged.
65
  He then stated, “[w]orkers’ lives are obviously worth 
more than that.
66
 Employers who ignore their employees’ safety should pay a 
penalty that will force them to change their negligent ways. It is the only 
realistic way to save lives. A mild slap on the wrist is not enough.”
67
 Senator 
Kennedy went on to compare the civil penalty provisions in other regulatory 
laws. Violating the South Pacific Tuna Act of 1988 can net a fine of 
$325,000.
68
  A Clean Air Act violation can result in a fine of $270,000, while a 
violation of the Fluid Milk Promotion Act can cost $130,000.
69
 Senator 
Kennedy added, “[p]rotecting tuna fisheries is important, but so is 
safeguarding workers’ lives and we need to raise OSHA’s penalties if we hope 
 
 65 When A Worker Is Killed: Do Osha Penalties Enhance Workplace Safety?, Hearing on S. 110-895, 
Hearing Before The S. Comm. On Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 110
th
 Cong. 3 (Apr. 29, 2008). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 5. 
KARMEL GALLEYSFINAL 4/20/2016  10:52 AM 
2016] WHAT CAN WE DO? 117 
to deter unsafe working conditions.”
70
 In March 2010, Dr. David Michaels, the 
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health, testified 
before Congress on the need for enhanced civil penalties.
71
 He noted that when 
a tank full of sulphiric acid exploded at a refinery in 2001, literally dissolving a 
worker there, the employer was only fined $175,000 by OSHA.
72
 But, in the 
same incident, the Environmental Protection Agency fined the employer $10 
million for violating the Clean Water Act, when thousands of fish and crabs 
were discovered dead from the explosion run-off.
73
 It is abundantly clear, that 
by applying a free market analysis to the issue of penalties, there is simply no 
financial incentive for employers to provide a safe workplace. 
There is no genuine dispute that the civil penalty regime in the OSHAct is 
woefully inadequate as a meaningful deterrent to prevent safety violations. For 
a “willful violation,” Section 17 (a) of OSHAct provides that the maximum 
civil penalty is $70,000, and not less than $5,000.
74
 Keep in mind that willful is 
the most demanding civil standard, and requires a violation that the employer 
knowingly commits, or commits with plain indifference to the law.
75
 The 
employer either knows that what he or she is doing constitutes a violation, or is 
aware that a hazardous condition existed, and still made no reasonable effort to 
eliminate it.
76
 According to the United States Attorneys’ Manual, willful is the 
failure to comply with a safety standard under the OSHAct if done knowingly 
and purposely by an employer who, having a free will or choice, either 
intentionally disregards the standard, or is plainly indifferent to its 
requirement.
77
 An omission or failure to act is willfully done if done 
voluntarily and intentionally.
78
 Some courts have even permitted an employer 
to argue ignorance of the law in considering an employer’s intent.
79
 
For a “serious violation,” a lesser penalty than willful, an employer can be 
fined up to $7,000, which is for a violation where there is substantial 
 
 70 Id. at 4. 
 71 Subcomm. On Workforce Protections, Comm. On Educ. and Labor, H.R. 1 (Mar. 16, 2010) (statement 
of David Michaels, Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health, U.S. Dept. of Labor). 
 72 Id. at 2. 
 73 Id. 
 74 29 U.S.C. § 666 (1970). 
 75 U.S. Dept. of Labor, CPL 02-00-159, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN. INSTRUCTION 2 
(Oct. 1, 2015). 
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 77 OFFICES OF THE U.S. ATTORNEYS, Criminal Resource Manual 2001–2099, OSHA—Willful Violation of 
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probability that death or serious physical harm could result, and that the 
employer knew, or should have known, of the hazard.
80
 
Section 17(e) provides that for a willful violation resulting in the death of 
an employee, an employer “shall, upon conviction” be punished by no more 
than $10,000, or not more than six months in prison.
81
 For a recidivist 
employer, who is convicted for a violation “after a first conviction” of causing 
the death of an employee, the OSHAct merely doubles the maximum penalties 
to $20,000, or one year in jail.
82
 Arguably, general criminal penalties in 18 
U.S.C. Sec. 3571 (c) (4) of the United States Code can apply, with maximum 
penalties of $250,000 for individual, or $500,000 for corporations, who 
willfully cause the death of an individual.
83
 However, as discussed 
momentarily, most U.S. Attorneys have been reluctant to prosecute worker 
death cases, preferring instead to invest their resources in bigger headlines, 
such as drugs, political corruption and terrorism cases. 
Section 17 has other penalties, not directly related to the death or injury of 
a worker. If anyone “gives advance notice of any inspection,” and tips off an 
employer so it can cover up a possible workplace hazard, the maximum 
penalties, for what amounts to an obstruction of justice, are $2,000, or six 
months in jail.
84
 Finally, making false statements, or perjury, in documents that 
need to be reported under the Act, such as injury reports, are punishable by a 
maximum penalty of $10,000, or six months in jail.
85
 
Historically, the maximum fines described above have rarely been applied. 
In 2007, the average penalty for a serious violation, where there is a substantial 
probability that death or serious physical harm could occur, was $906.
86
 For 
violations that are “other than serious,” the average OSHA fine was only $40.
87
 
In death cases, the average OSHA penalty assessed in 2007 was just $2,343.
88
 
The already low maximum penalties, particularly for the most common serious 
violations, are routinely adjusted downward based on an employer’s size and 
history, often resulting in a reduction of 30–70%.
89
 Thereafter, when 
 
 80 U.S. Dept. of Labor, CPL 02-00-159, supra note 75 at 6-1 (2015). 
 81 Id. at 4-20. 
 82 Id. 
 83 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (c)(4) (2001). 
 84 U.S. Dept. of Labor, CPL 02-00-159, supra note 75 at 3-3, 6-16 (2015).  
 85 Id. at 11-6 (2015). 
 86 When A Worker Is Killed: Do Osha Penalties Enhance Workplace Safety?, supra note 65 at 16–17. 
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With a change in administration at OSHA after the 2008 election, the 
enforcement emphasis began to change, as well. In June 2010, OSHA adopted 
the Severe Violator Enforcement Program (“SVEP”), intended to focus 
enforcement efforts on significant hazards and violations, such as fall dangers, 
amputations dangers, combustible dust, silica exposure, excavation/trenching 
dangers, and shipbuilding hazards.
91
 In addition, OSHA revised its penalty 
policies, and the factors used to adjust penalties. However, for employers with 
between one and 25 employees, the reduction factor is as high as 60%, even 
though small businesses have high injury rates.
92
 Even with a new emphasis, 
total OSHA work site inspections have remained flat over a five-year period 
from 2009 to 2013, at around 39,000.
93
 During the same time period, total 
violations actually fell almost by 10,000, including in all categories, except 
repeat violations.
94
  OSHA claims that the number of violations has declined 
due to its enhanced and proactive enforcement activity, although the minimum 
proposed penalty for a serious violation increased only to $500 before 




  The Section 17 statutory penalties, meager as they are, have only been 
adjusted upward one time—in 1990—since the OSHAct was passed.
96
 
Moreover, unlike other federal enforcement agencies, the penalties in the 
OSHAct have been exempt from the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation 
Adjustment Act.
97
 Not adjusting the penalties for inflation reduces their real 
dollar value by around 39%.
98
 The Protecting America’s Workers Act 
(“PAWA”) seeks to correct this by increasing the penalties for serious and 
willful violations.
99
 This increase would only recalibrate the real dollar value 
 
 90 Id.  
 91 U.S. Dept. of Labor, CPL 02-00-149, SEVERE VIOLATOR ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM  (June 18, 2010). 
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to 1990 values.
100
 Nonetheless, there must be a price point for workplace 
hazards that will incentivize employers to create and operate safe workplaces. 
In a sliver of good news, in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Congress 
approved an increase in fines that OSHA and other agencies could levy pegged 
to the Consumer Price Index, and automatically adjusted for inflation going 
forward.
101
 What this means is that civil penalties for serious OSHAct 
violations could increase to around $12,700, from the current maximum 
amount of $7,000.
102
 Willful violations could increase to $127,000 from the 
current limit of $70,000.
103
 The increases must still await regulatory guidance 
before they can be implemented, a process that may delay the increases for 
months.
104
 Finally, the legislation provides that an agency head can reduce the 
penalty from the maximum amount based on certain factors, including the all-
consuming loophole that the penalty would have a negative economic 
impact.
105
 What penalty doesn’t have a negative impact? By definition, any 
penalty naturally has some negative economic impact. However, the real 
question is whether these, or any penalties, will help reduce workplace 
injuries? While it is too soon to know the effects these long overdue increases 
will have on protecting workers, a study in 2015 by the Institute for Work and 
Health concluded that there is a strong correlation between penalties and 
citations and a reduced rate of workplace injuries.
106
 But, at the very least, the 
increases may represent a small recognition by Congress that the penalty 
regime in federal regulatory statutes, particularly the OSHAct, is woefully 
inadequate as a deterrence to violators. 
How about a criminal prosecution? It would be difficult to argue that the 
threat of meaningful jail time is not a deterrent, except to the sociopath.  Yet, 
as already discussed, under the OSHAct, the maximum jail time for the death 
of a worker as a result of an employer’ willful violation of workplace safety 
laws, is only six months.
107
 Criminal deterrence should be measured in years, 
 
 100 Comm. On Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, S. 1 (Apr. 27, 2010) (statement of David 
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not months. As stated by Senator Kennedy, “[i]f you improperly import an 
exotic bird, you can go to jail for two years. If you deal in counterfeit money, 
you are looking at 20 years.”
108
  His point was obvious. Without a credible 
threat of jail, “many companies treat safety violations as another cost of doing 
business.”
109
 The criminal provisions of the OSHAct must be strengthened to 
protect American workers. 
Currently, Section 17 (e), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 666(e), provides that a Class B 
misdemeanor prosecution for an OSHAct violation will occur only (1) for 
willful violations of worker safety regulations, and (2) that result in the death 
of a worker. The closest comparison to Section 17 (e) in state and federal 
criminal codes is involuntary manslaughter, a felony that has a wide range of 




Beyond the insignificant civil penalties and jail time, the statute as 
presently written is a failure on many levels. First, using a willful standard 
allows an employer to use their ignorance of the law as a defense to the 
element of intent, which is contrary to well established American jurisprudence 
that ignorance of the law is no defense. Second, changing the standard to 
“knowing” violations is more in line with other regulatory crimes, such as 
violations of environmental laws. Under this standard, a defendant need only 
know of facts or circumstances that are unsafe, and need not know that the 
unsafe conditions are a violation of a particular safety regulation or law. This 
also eliminates the ignorance of the law defense. Third, permitting 
prosecutions only where a worker has died ignores the seriousness of most 
other safety violations, which can result in horrific injuries and lifetime pain 
and suffering. Moreover, violations that endanger workers, even if no injury or 
death has occurred, should be criminalized in appropriate circumstances. This 
is a common sense and proactive approach that does not wait until a worker 
gets injured or dies. A criminal worker endangerment provision would also 
have a strong deterrent effect in incidents where an employer is aware of 
unsafe work conditions, which have not yet injured or killed a worker. Fourth, 
classifying worker safety crimes involving the death of a worker as only a 
misdemeanor, all but guarantees that a prosecutor will not waste their limited 
resources for crimes that Congress has reserved for the most egregious 
 
 108 When a Worker Is Killed: Do OSHA Penalties Enhance Workplace Safety?, supra note 65 at 42-210 
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KARMEL GALLEYSFINAL 4/20/2016  10:52 AM 
122 EMORY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILTY REVIEW [Vol. 3 
felonies. Finally, criminal prosecutions have to be expanded to include 
supervisors, and not just the “employer.” Supervisors have the authority to 
direct the employees, and can place them in harm’s way. Importantly, putting 
supervisors at risk for criminal prosecutions might also have the added benefit 
of creating an important layer of whistleblowers with direct knowledge of an 
employer’s internal polices and decisions that create the unsafe workplace in 
the first place. 
Given this list of inherent structural flaws in the OSHAct’s criminal 
regime, it is clear that OSHA has been severely constrained in its ability to 
keep workers safe through the threat of criminal prosecutions. According to the 
Department of Labor, between 1970 and 2008, there were 341,000 workplace 
fatalities.
111
 Yet, during this same time period, there were only 68 
prosecutions, resulting in a total of 42 months in jail.
112
 From 2010 through 
2013, despite a more robust OSHA, there were only 40 referrals for criminal 
prosecution, and only three referrals in 2013.
113
 And, most referrals are 
declined for prosecution.
114
 During this same time period, nearly 20,000 
workers were killed on the job.
115
 
In the end, prosecuting regulatory crimes that result in death, has not been a 
priority for any Department of Justice or U.S. Attorney’s office. Worker death 
cases are simply not headline grabbers that can help catapult an ambitious U.S. 
Attorney to political fame and glory, or to riches in private practice as a 
defender of prominent white-collar criminals. Nonetheless, in December 2015, 
the U.S. Departments of Labor and Justice entered into a Memorandum of 
Understanding (“MOU”) “to provide for coordination of matters pertaining to 
worker safety that could lead to criminal prosecutions by DOJ.”
116
 On its face, 
the MOU looks like a meaningful change in prosecutorial emphasis. However, 
it did not change any statutory enforcement provisions, commit to prosecute 
any cases, or add any new resources. Instead, it merely promised to share 
information, cooperate and coordinate between the Departments. Indeed, it 
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clearly states that, “[n]othing in this MOU commits DOJ to investigate or 
prosecute any particular worker-safety incident.”
117
 
Other regulatory statutes have stronger criminal provisions. Environmental 
laws, for example, have meaningful criminal penalties, and nearly every 
federal and state prosecutor’s office has an environmental specialist tasked 
with investigating and prosecuting environmental crimes.
118
 The Clean Water 
Act (“CWA”) makes it a crime to negligently discharge a pollutant into a water 
system of the United States without a permit, or in violation of a permit, 
punishable by one year in prison.
119
 Knowing violations are punishable by 
three years in jail, and fines up to $100,000 per day.
120
 The CWA has many 
other provisions that criminalize conduct, including a “knowing 
endangerment” crime, which has been used to protect workers from their 
employer’s crimes to the environment.
121
 Knowing endangerment makes it a 
crime if an individual or a corporation “knew at the time that such acts put 
another in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury.”
122
 Conviction of 
this crime under the CWA carries with it a 15 year prison sentence, and a 
$1,000,000 fine for a corporation.
123
 While not intended exclusively as a 
worker safety law, some federal prosecutors have used these “knowing 
endangerment” crimes under environmental laws, such as the CWA and the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, to protect workers from life 
threatening environmental conditions created by their employers, and that the 
OSHAct is unable to do.
124
 
There is a legitimate debate that these criminal laws are not being utilized 
enough as a deterrent against environmental crimes, and that DOJ resources 
focus more on fighting terrorism and drugs. In a battle of numbers, the 
Environmental Protection Agency reported that in Fiscal Year 2013 it assessed 
more than $1.5 billion in criminal fines and restitution, and charged 281 
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defendants, resulting in 161 years of incarceration.
125
  Critics claimed these 
victories came from a relatively few big name prosecutions.
126
 Nonetheless, 
the obvious point is that the OSHAct does not even have meaningful criminal 
laws on the books in the event that enforcement priorities begin to recalibrate. 
More galling, is that there is not even a “knowing endangerment” crime in 
America’s worker safety statute. Protection for workers in that area must come 
from environmental laws, and increasingly from state prosecutions.
127
 
Prosecuting worker safety crimes under other statutes, rare as they are, merely 
underscore the toothlessness of the OSHAct’s enforcement provisions. 
Nonetheless, there is one notable prosecution that may send a strong message 
of deterrence. 
On April 5, 2010, at 3:02 p.m., an explosion erupted at the Upper Big 
Branch Mine (“UBB”) near Montcoal in Raleigh County West Virginia.
128
 
Fueled by high levels of coal dust, methane gas exploded in a fireball deep 
inside the UBB mine, and roared through more than two miles of underground 
tunnels.
129
 Twenty-nine miners were killed.
130
 The UBB mine was owned by 
the Massey Energy Company, which was the fourth largest coal producer in 
the United States.
131
 At the time of the explosion, Massey’s CEO was Don 
Blankenship, a tall and physically imposing figure, with dark brooding 
features.
132
 Blankenship rose from poverty in West Virginia to become a 
powerful and feared coal baron.
133
 He used the courts and politicians to shield 
Massey, and himself, from accountability, while becoming the largest coal 
producer in Central Appalachia.
134
 As an example of Blankenship’s influence, 
he contributed $3 million to defeat an incumbent justice on West Virginia’s 
Supreme Court, at a time that Massey was appealing a $50 million civil 
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judgment.
135
 Predictably, the court overturned the judgment. The deciding 
votes were provided by the newly elected Justice Brent Benjamin, who 
Blankenship helped elect, as well as the Chief Justice.
136
 Four months earlier, 
Blankenship and the Chief Justice were reportedly seen vacationing together in 
the French Riviera.
137
 In June 2009, the United States Supreme Court reversed 
the decision based on the undue influence that Blankenship had on Justice 
Benjamin’s campaign for the West Virginia Supreme Court, at a time when 
Massey had a pending case before it.
138
 The U.S. Supreme Court concluded, 
“that Blankenship’s campaign efforts had a significant and disproportionate 
influence in placing Justice Benjamin on the case.”
139
 
Because of Blankenship’s outsized influence, no one believed that he or 
Massey would be held accountable for the deaths of the 29 miners. Only two 
years before the explosion at UBB, federal prosecutors refused to bring 
charges against Blankenship for an explosion at another Massey owned mine, 
which killed two miners there.
140
 But, shortly after the UBB explosion, 
President Obama appointed Booth Goodwin to become the new U.S. Attorney 
for the Southern District of West Virginia.
141
 While other investigations into 
the UBB disaster continued, including Congressional hearings where mine 
safety reforms were blocked by House Republicans, Goodwin’s office 
methodically began to build its case against Massey and Blankenship.
142
 The 
investigation went forward despite a public relations campaign mounted by 
Massey in the immediate aftermath of the explosion, which warned against a 
“rush to judgment,” and a statement by Blankenship around the time of the 
funerals that, “any suspicion that the mine was improperly operated or illegally 
operated or anything like that would be unfounded.”
143
 During the 
investigation, Blankenship, and other Massey officials, asserted their Fifth 
Amendment rights in December 2010, and refused to answer government 
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investigators’ questions.
144
 Two months later, Massey’s security chief was 
charged with lying to investigators, and trying to destroy evidence.
145
 He was 
convicted and sentenced to prison.
146
The following year, in February 2012, the 
UBB mine superintendent was charged by Goodwin’s office with conspiracy 
to violate mine safety laws.
147
 The superintendent pled guilty and spent 21 
months in jail.
148
 In the meantime, West Virginia legislators passed a mine 
safety reform bill, which was greatly watered downed by industry lobbyists 
and prominently included a drug testing provision of miners—even though 
there was no connection between drug use and the UBB explosion.
149
 Still, the 
investigation continued. The big break came when Goodwin’s office 
announced that a longtime Massey official, David Hughart, would plead guilty 
to a conspiracy to violate mine safety laws and cooperate with the criminal 
investigation.
150
 In entering his plea, Hughart alleged that Blankenship was 
part of the conspiracy.
151
 Hughart was sentenced to 42 months in prison.
152
 The 
noose around Blankenship was getting tighter. 
Finally, on November 13, 2014, Goodwin announced the indictment of 
Blankenship.
153
 In a 43 page criminal indictment styled, United States of 
America v. Donald L. Blankenship, Criminal No. 5:14-cr-00244, Goodwin’s 
office charged Blankenship with four counts of conspiring to violate mine 
safety laws related to the ventilation and control of coal dust rules, a 
conspiracy to cover up the violations, and to interfering with the government’s 
enforcement efforts by providing advance warnings of mine inspections.
154
 
Reading like a novel of abuse of power, threats and intimidation, the 
indictment charged Blankenship, “with the routine violation of its [Massey] 
ventilation plan,” and that beginning in April 2009, Blankenship requested and 
received daily reports detailing Massey’s violations of mandatory federal mine 
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standards, and estimates of the fines for these violations.
155
 In the first six 
months of 2009, the reports that Blankenship received showed that the UBB 
mines were cited for approximately 596 violations of mine safety laws, mostly 
related to the accumulation of combustible coal dust that eventually ignited in 
a fireball.
156
 A major cause of the accumulated dust was that Blankenship 
deliberately understaffed UBB with too few miners dedicated to “non-coal 
production time,” which is necessary to make sure that the safety laws are 
being followed.
157
 During this same time period, Blankenship demanded and 
received production reports that detailed an reasons for delays every thirty 
minutes, even when he was at his home on evenings and weekends.
158
 The 
indictment revealed Blankenship’s micro management of the UBB mine, down 
to how many miners were hired.
159
 Blankenship, the indictment charged, 
pressured managers to cut the number of miners assigned to critical safety-law 
compliance jobs, including those jobs required to properly ventilate and clean 
up accumulated coal dust.
160
 He threatened the jobs of mine managers over 
safety compliance, and tied their compensation to the routine violation of 
safety laws.
161
 Obsessed with coal production and profit over safety, the 
indictment charged Blankenship with instructing coal managers to “run some 
coal,” and that “we’ll worry about ventilation and other issues at an appropriate 
time. Now is not the time.”
162
  In announcing the indictment, Goodwin took 
note to say that a conviction carried a maximum prison time of 31 years.
163
 
In response, Blankenship attacked the indictment as “political,” while his 
lawyer asserted that Blankenship was “a tireless advocate for mine safety.”
164
 
Blankenship retired from Massey in December 2010, in a deal that provided 
him with $12 million in cash.
165
 The following month, Alpha Natural 
Resources, Inc. announced that it would purchase Massey for over $7 
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billion.
166
 In a prepared statement after the indictment, Alpha took pains to 
note that Blankenship left Massey before the acquisition, and that he “was 
never an employee of Alpha Natural Resources.”
167
 A Superseding Indictment 
was filed on March 10, 2015, that consolidated some of the conspiracy 
allegations.
168
 Blankenship’s lawyers filed numerous motions, including a 
Motion to Dismiss for Selective and Vindictive Prosecution. Blankenship 
claimed that he was being prosecuted in violation of his First Amendment 
rights only after he released a documentary film entitled, “Upper Big Branch—
Never Again,” a piece of YouTube propaganda which blamed regulators for 
the explosion, and that the film inflamed the “West Virginia Democratic 
Establishment,” including Senator Joe Manchin, as well as union leaders.
169
 
U.S. District Judge Irene Berger denied Blankenship’s motion.
170
 She also 
denied his motion to disqualify Judge Berger, “and All the Judges of the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia.”
171
 
Blankenship’s lawyers claimed that Judge Berger and others could not be fair 
because Goodwin’s father is a Judge presiding in the same district.
172
 This 
claim came from the same man who the United States Supreme Court held 
exerted an “exceptional case” of influence, and which created a “probability of 
bias” that required Justice Benjamin’s recusal.
173
 Judge Berger denied this 
motion, as well, and set the case for trial in October 2015.
174
 
In a not entirely coincidental matter, in April 2015, the Department of 
Labor reported that black lung disease has killed more than 70,000 miners 
between 1970 and 2013, while permanently disabling many thousands more.
175
 
Black lung was supposed to have been eradicated in 1969 with safety reforms, 
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including by regulations on coal dust control and ventilation.
176
 At the same 
time, the Mine Safety and Health Administration reported that miner deaths 
increased in 2014, totaling 44, while a record low of 16 deaths were reported in 
coal mines.
177
 A couple of thoughts on these facts. Blankenship and Massey 
were certainly not responsible for all of the black lung deaths in this time 
period. But, it is just as certain, that at Massey plants, including where the 
indictment alleges among other things, a criminal disregard for coal dust and 
ventilations regulations, many miners there developed black lung.  And, it is 
likely that many more miners died at UBB mines under Blankenship’s reign 
from the disregard of safety laws, than only the 29 miners killed in the UBB 
explosion. And, finally, the decline in coal miner deaths in 2014 just may have 
had something to do with Booth Goodwin’s four-year investigation, and 
prosecution of Massey officials, leading up to Blankenship’s indictment. 
In the end, Don Blankenship finally stood trial. At the Robert C. Byrd 
United States Courthouse in Charleston, West Virginia, jury selection began on 
October 1, 2015. According to court transcripts, 88 citizens living within the 
20 counties that make up the Southern District of West Virginia were 
summoned for jury duty. After the first day of jury selection, 42 potential 
jurors were dismissed, whittled down through voire dire examination by Judge 
Berger, and from answers on questionnaires originally mailed to over 300 
potential jurors in the district. Potential jurors were excused for cause, 
including one who worried that Blankenship might be a “scapegoat,” while 
another said that Blankenship was “a horrible person with questionable morals 
and no work ethics.”
178
  Jury selection lasted four days before 12 jurors and 
alternates were finally seated. The evidentiary portion of the trial lasted 23 
days.
179
 The government called 28 witnesses, including miners and UBB 
officials who testified that safety violations were a known and accepted way of 
doing business.
180
 There were more than 500 exhibits introduced into 
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evidence.
181




The jury deliberated for parts of ten days, despite defense motions for a 
mistrial.
183
 On December 3, more than five years after the UBB explosion, the 
jury convicted Blankenship of criminal conspiracy to willfully violate federal 
mine safety standards, convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he ruthlessly 
demanded that miners produce as much coal as possible and without regard to 
their safety.
184
 He was acquitted on the lesser charges of securities fraud and 
making false statements to investigators.
185
 
While Booth Goodwin and his team achieved a conviction on the most 
important count in the indictment in terms of the safety of miners at UBB and 
elsewhere, the crimes of securities fraud and lying to investigators involved 
more jail time—possibly 30 years in prison
186
—than knowingly violating 
thousands of safety rules at UBB which finally exploded in a fireball killing 29 
miners. In a final insult to the families of the dead miners, the count of 
conspiracy to willfully violate federal mine safety standards is only a 
misdemeanor with a maximum one-year prison sentence, and a $250,000 
fine.
187
 In the criminal justice system, jurors are not told by the court during 
deliberations what the penalty is for a conviction of any count.
188
 Jurors decide 
guilt or innocence based on the evidence while Congress decides the penalty. 
According to the wisdom of Congress, known violations of mine safety laws 
that resulted in the deaths of one or 29 miners is punishable only up to one-
year in prison. 
Blankenship’s lawyers immediately filed an appeal claiming that the trial 
was “full of errors,” and the lead lawyer boldly declared that he was “as 
confident as I’ve ever been” that the verdict would be thrown out by the Court 
of Appeals.
189
 In an interview after the trial, one of the jurors expressed 
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frustration at learning that Blankenship was only facing a possible one-year 
sentence.
190
 Bill Rose, who drove 118 miles each day to the courthouse said, “I 
wish we could have got more, you know—because I know—I assume since the 
other ones were felonies—he would ultimately get more fines or jail time, but 
that’s not how it went down.”
191
 
In the immediate aftermath of the verdict, the fault lines cleaved along the 
issue of the need for more oversight and regulation, and stronger criminal 
penalties.
192
 Leading the charge against the prosecution, The Wall Street 
Journal naturally trotted out its favorite bogeyman and wrote that turning an 
industrial accident into a crime was yet another example of an “Obama-era” 
prosecution.
193
 The WSJ declared victory for the defense as Blankenship 
avoided the prospect of more serious jail time, and audaciously asserted that 
“Massey had paid dearly” in the millions of dollars that it paid in fines and 




A day after the verdict, Virginia Rep. Bobby Scott, called for tougher 
penalties for mine violators who knowingly ignore mine safety standards that 
expose miners to significant risk of injury, illness or death.
195
 The Robert C. 
Byrd Mine Safety Protection Act, introduced in April 2015 in the House by 
Scott and in the Senate by Bob Casey, D-PA., would make it a felony 
punishable for up to five years in prison for doing what Blankenship was 
convicted of by the Charleston jury.
196
 There were no Republican co-sponsors 
of the legislation including any of West Virginia’s three Republican House 
members.
197
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In the meantime, Blankenship sought and received permission from the 
court to leave the Charleston jurisdiction for the Christmas holidays in 2015 to 
travel back to his new home in Las Vegas.
199
 For the families of the dead 
miners, and other miners hoping for an effective deterrent to safety violators, 
all they received was a lump of coal. 
On April 6, 2016, six years and one day after the UBB explosion, Judge 
Berger sentenced Blankenship to serve the maximum sentence of one year in 
prison, and to pay a $250,000 fine.
200
 At the sentencing hearing, Judge Berger 
said, “By putting profits of the company ahead of the safety of your miners, 
you, Mr. Blankenship, created a culture of non-compliance at Upper Big 
Branch.” Earlier, Judge Berger had denied a defense motion to allow 




As Don Blankenship will soon discover, meaningful prison time measured 
in years, and not months, is a deterrent. Is it the silver bullet? Certainly, not. 
But, it is, and must be, an integral part of comprehensive occupational safety 
and health reform. There must be a very high price to pay for key decision 
makers when worker safety rules are ignored and violated. So, to all the Don 
Blankenships who daily perform cost-benefit analyses on compliance with 
worker safety laws, versus corporate bottom line profits and shareholder 
return, it must unequivocally declared that crime against workers does not pay. 
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